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IndiaAbstract: DNA technology has proved to be a worthy investigative tool for releasing the innocent
citizens and bringing forth the person responsible for serious crimes. In a populated country like
India there is a requirement for these types of databases. The Union government is working on a
new version of a legislation that seeks to set up a national DNA database of ‘offenders’. As expected
with the great success of the use of forensic DNA databases, new challenges are coming up. To rise
to the challenges, different strategies have been proposed for increasing search capabilities, the
implementation of which is on-going. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US has
proposed to add more autosomal short tandem repeat (STR) loci to its current core set of loci.
The constant growth in the size of forensic DNA databases raises issues on the criteria of inclusion
and retention and doubts on the efﬁciency, commensurability and infringement of privacy of such
large personal data collections. People have difﬁculties that spill beyond the level of simple privacy
and conﬁdentiality issues.
ª 2015 The International Association of Law and Forensic Sciences (IALFS). Production and hosting by
Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Contents
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DNA technology has proved to be a worthy investigative tool
for releasing the innocent citizens and bringing forth the per-
son responsible for serious crimes. The motive of establishing
forensic DNA databases was to develop investigative leads
for solving crimes which usually was the purview of ‘‘criminal
justice agencies for law enforcement identiﬁcation purposes’’.1
Forensic DNA databases are now well established in many
countries in the world. The ﬁrst government database
(NDNAD) was set up by the United Kingdom in 1995 fol-
lowed by New Zealand.2 France set up the Fichier National
Automatise´ des Empreintes Ge´ne´tiques (FNAEG) in 1998.
In the USA, the FBI has organized the Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS) database. Originally intended for sex offend-
ers, they have since then been extended to include almost any
criminal offender.
In England and Wales, anyone arrested on suspicion of a
recordable offence must submit a DNA sample, the proﬁle
of which is then stored in the DNA database as a permanent
record. In Scotland, the law requires the DNA proﬁles of most
people who are acquitted to be removed from the database. In
Sweden, only the DNA proﬁles of criminals who have spent
more than two years in prison are stored. In Norway and Ger-
many, court orders are required, and are only available,
respectively, for serious offenders and for those convicted of
certain offences and who are likely to reoffend. Forty-nine
states in the USA, all apart from Idaho, store DNA proﬁles
of violent offenders, and many also store proﬁles of suspects.3
In 2005 the incoming Portuguese government proposed to
introduce a DNA database of the entire population of Portu-
gal.4 However, after an informed debate including the opinion
from the Portuguese Ethics Council5 the database to be intro-
duced was revised only to include criminals.6
The United States maintains the largest DNA database in
the world, with the CODIS holding over 9 million records as
of 2011.7 The United Kingdom maintains the National DNA
Database (NDNAD), which is of similar size. The size of this
database and its rate of growth, is giving concern to civil liber-
ties and political groups in the UK,8 where police have wide-
ranging powers to take samples and retain them even in the
event of acquittal.8 Other countries have adopted privately
developed DNA databases, such as Qatar, which has adopted
Bode dbSEARCH.9 In addition to direct matching between
known and unknown sample proﬁles, proﬁles from missing
persons and their relatives, as well as unidentiﬁed human
remains, are included in a number of databases.10,11
Missing person identiﬁcation also is an invaluable module
for investigating certain crimes. When a match is made from
a national DNA database to link a crime scene to an offender
who has provided a DNA sample to a database that link is
often referred to as a cold hit. A cold hit is of value in referring
the police agency to a speciﬁc suspect but is of less evidentialvalue than a DNA match made from outside the DNA data-
base. As of March 2011, 361,176 forensic proﬁles and
9,404,747 offender proﬁles have been accumulated,7 making
it the largest DNA database in the world. As of the same date,
CODIS has produced over 138,700 matches to request,
assisting in more than 133,400 investigations.12 The United
Kingdom National DNA Database consisted of an estimated
number of 5,512,776 proﬁles of individuals as of March
2011.13
The growing public approval of DNA databases has seen
the creation and expansion of many states’ own DNA data-
bases. California currently maintains the third largest DNA
database in the world (naturally, as CODIS contains all states’
database information). Political measures such as California
Proposition 69 (2004), which increased the scope of the
DNA database, have already met with a signiﬁcant increase
in the numbers of investigations aided. The application of
DNA databases has been expanded into two controversial
areas: arrestees and familial searching. An arrestee is a person
arrested for a crime and who has not yet been convicted for
that offence. Currently, 21 states have passed legislation that
allows law enforcement to take DNA from an arrestee and
enter it into the state’s CODIS DNA database to see if that
person has a criminal record or can be linked to any unsolved
crimes. In familial searching, the DNA database is used to
look for partial matches that would be expected between close
family members. This technology can be used to link crimes to
the family members of suspects and thereby help identify a
suspect when the perpetrator has no DNA sample in the
database.14
As expected, with the great success of the use of forensic
DNA databases, new challenges are coming up. The databases
are experiencing rapid growth, and thus there is a potential of
increased adventitious hits; the power for current and new
applications (e.g., missing person identiﬁcation and familial
searching) requires additional infrastructure support; and
there is an increased desire for international data sharing,15–
17 which possibly could be retarded if only a relatively small
number of loci is shared among laboratories worldwide.
2. Current scenario in India
In a populated country like India there is huge requirement
for these types of databases which may help in stopping dif-
ferent types of fraud like ration card fraud, voter identity
card fraud, driving license fraud etc. The database may help
the Indian police to differentiate the criminals and non crim-
inals. The Union government is working on a new version of
a legislation that seeks to set up a national DNA database of
‘offenders’, that allows for the collection and storage of
DNA samples of those accused in cases ranging from homi-
cide, sexual assault and rape to even violations under the
Motor Vehicle Act.
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ples for crime-related reasons began in 2003, when the Depart-
ment of Biotechnology (DoB) established a committee known
as the DNA Proﬁling Advisory Committee to make recom-
mendations for the drafting of the DNA Proﬁling Bill 2006,
which eventually became the Human DNA Proﬁling Bill
2007.18 The 2007 draft Bill was prepared by the DoB along
with the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics
(CDFD).19 The CDFD is an autonomous institution
supported by the DoB. In addition to the CDFD, there are
multiple Central Forensic Science Laboratories in India under
the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Central
Bureau of Investigation,20 along with a number of private lab-
oratories21 which analyze DNA samples for crime-related
purposes.
Activists have opposed the draft bill as a potential breach of
citizens’ privacy, and have challenged it on ethical and techni-
cal grounds. Helen Wallace, a member of Gene Watch, a
U.K.-based group advocating against DNA databases, feels
that India must learn from international experiences, particu-
larly from the U.K. which was the ﬁrst country to set up a
database in 1995 that even allowed retention of DNA records
of innocent citizens. In May, the U.K. passed the Protection of
Freedoms Act which will remove about 1 million records from
the database.
In a controversial move that threatens to increase the intru-
sion by the state into the lives of ordinary citizens, the Union
government in India is set to introduce a DNA Proﬁling Bill in
the winter session of Parliament. Once it becomes a law, the
bill will grant the authority to collect vast amount of sensitive
DNA data of citizens even if they are ‘‘suspects’’ in a criminal
case. The data will be held till the person is cleared by the
court.
The Bill has already raised the hackles of many groups
working on privacy issues who are worried that if it becomes
a law, it would empower the government to create intrusive
databases. The Bill proposes the creation of a national DNA
data bank that will be manned by a manager of the rank of
a joint secretary to the government of India. For activists, this
will help the government assume the role of an alarming ‘‘Big
Brother’’ collecting vast amount of sensitive data of citizens.
The preamble to the Bill admits that ‘‘DNA analysis offers
sensitive information which, if misused, can cause harm to a
person or society’’. The government has also slipped in a sec-
tion that allows for ‘‘volunteers’’ to give their DNA proﬁles
which will be maintained. It is not clear under what circum-
stances the ‘‘volunteers’’ will share their sensitive data with
the government.
The data, the Bill states, will also be used for the ‘‘creation
and maintenance’’ of population statistics and can be used for
‘‘identiﬁcation, research, protocol development or quality
control’’. Strangely enough, the penalty for ‘‘misuse’’ of the
DNA proﬁles attracts a mild imprisonment of a few months
or a ﬁne of a paltry Rs 50,000.
In fact, law enforcement agencies like the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) have been pushing the government for an
early enactment of the Bill. They have cited the ﬁndings of a
UK parliamentary report issued by its Ofﬁce of Science and
Technology in February 2006 that states that convictions in
criminal cases went up drastically after the government agreed
to maintain DNA proﬁling data in perpetuity. The report
records that the detection of crime in the UK went up from26% to a healthy 40% after DNA samples were loaded in
the national DNA database.
However, since this kind of a database usually co-exists
with crime statistics, there is a fear that members of minority
communities could be easily targeted. This is a concern that
has also been raised in the British parliamentary report which
says that ‘‘blacks and ethnic minorities are disproportionately
represented’’ in their database because more of them are
arrested for alleged crimes. Currently, the present Bill does
address these concerns of the inherent imbalance in racial pro-
ﬁling when maintaining a national DNA database.
Meanwhile, senior police ofﬁcials who are familiar with the
Bill and have made extensive presentations to the DoB are
upset that the Bill makes a provision for deleting the DNA
proﬁle data after a person has been acquitted by courts. They
feel that maintaining the data and increasing it slowly and stea-
dily will go a long way in preventing and solving crimes. While
that is a legitimate argument, the absence of a strong privacy
law raises concerns about the obtrusive nature of the proposed
DNA Proﬁling Bill.3. Beneﬁts and risks
The constant growth in the size of forensic DNA databases
raises issues on the criteria of inclusion and retention and
doubts on the efﬁciency, commensurability, and infringement
of privacy of such large personal data collections. In contrast
to the past, not only serious but all crimes are subject to
DNA analysis generating millions and millions of DNA pro-
ﬁles, many of which are stored and continuously searched in
national DNA databases. As always when big datasets are
gathered new mining procedures based on correlation became
feasible. For example, ‘Familial DNA Database Searching’ is
based on near matches between a crime stain and a data based
person, which could be a near relative of the true perpetrator.19
Again the ﬁrst familial search was successfully conducted in
the UK in 2004 and led to the conviction of Craig Harman
of manslaughter. Craig Harman of Frimley, Surrey was
convicted and jailed for six years on the basis of ‘‘familial
DNA searching’’, which linked him to the crime scene via a
close relative’s DNA proﬁle. The strategy was subsequently
applied in some US states but is not conducted at the national
level. It was during a dragnet that it ﬁrst became public knowl-
edge that the German police were also already involved in
familial search strategies. In a little town in Northern Germany
the police arrested a young man accused of rape because they
had analyzed the DNA of his two brothers who had partici-
pated in the dragnet. Because of partial matches between crime
scene DNA proﬁles and these brothers they had identiﬁed the
suspect. In contrast to other countries, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court of Germany decided in December 2012 against
the future court use of this kind of evidence. Alec Jeffreys early
on has questioned the way UK police collects DNA proﬁles,
holding not only convicted individuals but also arrestees with-
out conviction, suspects cleared in an investigation, or even
innocent people never charged with an offence.20 He also
criticized that large national databases as the NDNAD of
England and Wales are likely skewed socioeconomically. It
has been pointed out that most of the matches refer to minor
offences; according to GeneWatch in Germany 63% of the
database matches provided are related to theft while <3%
4 S. Kumar et al.related to rape and murder. The changes to the UK database
came in the 2012’s Protection of Freedoms Bill, following a
major defeat at the European Court of Human Rights in
2008. As of May 2013 1.1 million proﬁles (of about 7 million)
had been destroyed to remove innocent people’s proﬁles from
the database. The government of Portugal in 2005 proposed a
DNA database containing samples of all its inhabitants.
Despite the threats that such a universal system poses to citi-
zens’ liberties, the country does not seem alarmed enough.
So far, there has been little public debate. A recent study on
the public views on DNA database-related matters showed
that a more censorious attitude towards wider national data-
bases is correlated with the age and education of the respon-
dents.21 A deeper public awareness on the beneﬁts and risks
of very large DNA collections need to be built and common
ethical and privacy standards for the development and gover-
nance of DNA databases need to be adopted where the citi-
zen’s perspectives are taken into consideration.
4. Privacy and human rights
Citizens have some worries of privacy and conﬁdentiality
issues. The retention of DNA and ﬁngerprints from an individ-
ual on a database therefore allows a form of biological tagging
or ‘bio-surveillance’, which can be used to attempt to establish
where they have been.22 This means that DNA databases can
be used to track individuals who have not committed a crime,
or whose ‘crime’ is an act of peaceful protest or dispute. For
example, in a state where freedom of speech or political rights
are restricted, the police or secret services could attempt to
take DNA samples from the scene of a political meeting to
establish whether or not particular individuals had been
present. DNA databases link searchable computer records of
personal demographic information, such as name and ethnic
appearance, with the ability to biologically tag an individual
and track their whereabouts using their DNA proﬁle. An indi-
vidual’s relatives may also be identiﬁed through partial match-
ing with their DNA. Thus, DNA databases signiﬁcantly shift
the balance of power from the individual to the state.
These concerns do not relate solely to the collection, reten-
tion, access and the use of DNA sample that are the basic of
DNA proﬁle, but also to the other information that may be
kept. For example, if DNA is collected on arrest and retained
indeﬁnitely, there is additional information kept in the police
records of arrest and in the samples which may be stored in
the laboratories which analyzed them. People are concerned
about potential employers, other government entities or even
insurance companies getting access to their genetic informa-
tion. Insurance companies would have a huge interest in
conﬁrming the genetic health of people requesting to be
covered by health insurance; employers might also have inter-
est in gaining information about potential employee’s physical
health or even ethnicity and ancestry. Access to private
information could affect the employability of the person
applying for a job.
Concerns about ‘bio surveillance’ extend beyond the state
to anyone who can invade the system and obtain access to
an individual’s DNA proﬁle. This might include organized
criminal or terrorist groups, or anyone seeking to track down
an individual. For example, individuals on witness protection
schemes may have their appearance altered but cannot changetheir DNA. If someone becomes suspicious about them and
collects their DNA, their identity could be revealed by
matching this to a stored DNA proﬁle on a database, if this
is accessible and linked to their old identity. Their relatives
might also be found through ‘familial searching’ (looking for
partial matches with the DNA proﬁles of other people on
the database). Children who have been separated from an
adult for their own protection could also be tracked down
by someone with access to a DNA database if the adult has
a sample of their DNA (taken from an old toothbrush, for
example), or who shares part of their DNA proﬁle because
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